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Emergencies are characterised by uncertainty. This motivates the design of 
information systems that model and predict complex natural, material or human 
processes to support understanding and reduce uncertainty through prediction. 
The correspondence between system models and reality, however, is also 
governed by uncertainties, and designers have developed methods to render ‘the 
world’ transparent in ways that can inform, fine-tune and validate models. 
Additionally, people experience uncertainties in their use of simulation and 
prediction systems. This is a major obstacle to effective utilisation. We discuss 
ethically and socially motivated demands for transparency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When emergencies occur, they are characterised by their ‘un-ness’ – they are 
unexpected, unprecedented and unplanned for in their specific unfolding 
(Crichton 2003, cited in McMaster and Baber, 2008, p. 6). As these authors 
identify, the ‘un-ness’ can result in a number of uncertainties particularly when 
multiple agencies are involved. These include uncertainties about the nature of the 
crisis (fire or explosion?), details (location? access?), its cause (gas leak or 
terrorist attack?), available quality of information (source, relevance,accuracy?) 
and response goals and strategies.  
Modelling techniques have been developed to address these issues (Turoff, Hiltz, 
Bañuls, and Van Den Eede, 2013; Haynes, Jermusyk, and Ritter, 2014). 
Increasingly, the capability of generating and processing diverse, continuous and 
even live data feeds can augment situation awareness and decision-making. A 
recently developed BRIDGE project concept, for example, incorporates sensor 
data captured by drones, allowing dynamic analysis of environmental and 
meteorological data in an emergency caused by fire, which can be further 
interpreted by 3D models to estimate the threat to buildings, the immediate 
environment, victims and first responders and to recommend response strategies 
and necessary equipment (Steinhäusler, 2015). Predictive analytics can further 
augment crisis detection and response by detecting abnormal patterns with trained 
algorithms.  
While it is true that new capability for collecting a wider range of real-time data 
and feeding analyses to responders can support more detailed and constantly 
updated situational awareness as well as improved sense- and decision-making, 
these potentials generate new uncertainties, as well as ethical and legal issues. 
Whether data, analysis and prediction can be effectively utilised, depends 
critically on human and social factors.  
To chart ELSI in relation to uncertainty, simulation and prediction, this paper 
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starts with discussions on uncertainties emerging from modelling and prediction 
processes, before elaborating different practices that responders undertake to 
reason and analyse incidents together with their IT tools. This informs further 
discussion on design implications for modelling and prediction technologies.   
MODELLING AND PREDICTING CROWD EVACUATION: AN EXAMPLE 
Modelling and predicting unfolding crisis impacts are complex and difficult tasks. 
Modelling the damage to architectural structures can draw on generic structural 
characteristics, e.g. structural similarities between airport and train terminals, but 
can be complicated by uncertain knowlede about passengers (e.g. gender, age, 
disabilities, movement patterns) when estimating the impacts of fire or explosions 
(Steinhäusler, 2015). This section discusses a study of modelling, simulating and 
predicting crowd movement in the Central Station in Cologne, Germany to 
unpack some uncertainties emerging during modelling processes.    
The VeRSiert project (http://www.versiert.info/) aims to provide tools to 
understand and predict crowd movement when evacuation is required during 
major events. The research categorised public events for preparing scenarios of 
incidents during sport, music and religious events in Cologne as case studies. The 
main challenges for the design team arose when using data mining, assembling 
appropriate algorithms and generating data for modelling (Heuer, Roßnagel, 
Zibuschka, and Maucher, 2012). The team used multiple ways of generating 
‘empirical data’ for modelling and predicting crowd behaviours. They took photos 
and measured the geometry of important features of the station, as well as 
performing passenger counts during a large music event and on a normal working 
day. Passengers were counted going in and leaving the station within specific time 
frames, at regular intervals. The researchers adapted ‘single person pursuit’, 
following randomly selected passengers to record their paths, pauses and 
activities. The expectation is to provide a ‘quick, powerful, flexible and cost-
efficient’ means to crowd and crisis management, particularly diverting 
passengers away from exits that are more prone to congestion.  
The research team identified a range of issues that could affect the usefulness of 
their models. There are complex passenger preferences and behaviours in the 
Cologne area, which are difficult to take into account when drafting the scenarios 
or when modelling and predicting the crowd. Algorithms themselves can also 
present difficulties. The selection of appropriate algorithms for particular models, 
domains and purposes depends on experiences and specialist knowledge. 
Therefore, previously proven effectiveness, as a concept or tested in experiments, 
has to be validated again, often requiring parameter adjustment.  For the project, 
the aim was to use simulation footage for engaging with stakeholders and 
extracting feedback to refine the models and parameters.  
While the discussion in this paper focuses on a particular case, the issues 
discussed are widely relevant to simulation and prediction. Scenario preparation, 
parameter adjustment and context-fitting of algorithms are commonly shared 
practices and provide evidence of how uncertainties emerge in modelling and 
prediction. Particularly important dimensions of these uncertainties are:. 
• Probabilistic and exploratory understandings: Some aspects of 
emergency management are more easily quantifiable than others. 
Physical features and passenger flows can be quantified to a certain 
extent, but it can be difficult to quantify precisely the values, benefits and 
costs of tasks, assets and people (even for ordinal orders). Also, when 
support for decision-making is concerned, uncertainty can arise when 
breaking down tasks by conditional logic (e.g. If …, then ...) for model 
and scenario building (Haynes et al., 2014), because responders treat 
incidents and uncertainties in an exploratory way, evaluating and reacting 
to unfolding details of their discovery and response to crisis situations.  
• Parameters and negotiation: Looking into parameters can ‘enhance the 
understanding of the impact of uncertainties and tradeoffs’ (Münzberg, 
Wiens, and Schultmann, 2014, p. 52). Particularly when predictive 
analyses are used for detecting occurrences of abnormal incidents, e.g., 
distinguishing bioterrorism from diseases in epidemiological outbreaks, 
parameters can become sites of uncertainty, ambiguity and tradeoffs. 
Higher sensitivity encourages earlier response, but also higher chance of 
costly false alarms. However, increasing specificity of the results  (i.e. 
true positives and negatives) and lowering thresholds for alarm triggers 
could risk missing signs for early detection (Berndt et al., 2007).  
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• Data availability and completeness: ‘There is always incomplete 
information and uncertainty’ because ideal datasets are ‘usually too 
expensive and often simply unattainable’ (Berndt et al., 2007, p. 1388). 
Moreover, there can be multiple constraints dynamically arising for 
evacuation, and there may be secondary attacks in man-made crises. 
Decisions made based on the initial crisis can have implications or even 
create path dependencies for how responses to subsequent events can 
proceed, and anticipating and imagining cascading consequences can 
affect how you treat the first one (Arora et al., 2010).  However carefully 
models and algorithms are trained, results are approximations and require 
trust as well as in situ evaluation, and uncertainties are inescapable. 
These can have serious consequences for use.  
More frameworks and techniques have been developed than we can discuss in 
detail here, not least non-probabilistic uncertainties and sensitivity analyses 
(Mingers and Rosenhead, 2004; Bertsch, Geldermann and Rentz, 2007; Durbach 
and Stewart, 2012). They differentiate the nature and episteme of uncertainties 
and how they can be treated. However, the discussion we present above speaks of 
uncertainty as persistently emerging as models themselves develop and thus as a 
site of continued ambiguity and trade-offs. To make effective use of modelling 
and prediction techniques during crises, it becomes necessary to remain sensitive 
to the issues of where within the modelling process uncertainties could arise and 
how reasoning is carried out by modelling and prediction technologies. The 
importance of supporting this way of understanding uncertainty and modelling is 
discussed in the next section.   
WORKING WITH MODELS 
To unpack how practitioners encounter modelling and prediction systems, the 
discussion below draws on an in-depth study of the difficulties and problems 
occurring when negotiating with an intelligent dispatch system. Whalen (1995) 
reviews a costly shift towards an intelligent vehicle dispatch system that measured 
and predicted unit location, and automated the reasoning process of incident 
analysis and dispatch decisions. Before the intelligent system, run files were used 
as a decision support tool, detailing resources, vehicles and their priorities in 
relation to a given address. Vehicle dispatch decisions were worked out by 
dispatchers who analysed details of an incident, evaluated vehicles required for it 
and worked out their availability (by tracking vehicles on an additional note pad). 
Their reasoning required extensive knowledge and expertise acquired from 
understanding an area’s geography, departmental policy and procedures, different 
types of incidents, etc. This knowledge, experience and understanding was 
developed socially and collaboratively, through coordinating tasks, updating and 
interpreting information, and sharing skills and practices.  
However, as the new intelligent system was taken into use, it became clear that 
the system failed to represent or reproduce the knowledge, intelligence and social 
practices in the attempt of replacing them with algorithmic reasoning. The new 
system placed preference on models and algorithms, and had various 
complications in the design of the system. Only the machine’s recommended 
dispatch choices were shown to dispatchers, and the contextual information for 
deriving the recommendation, e.g. the location and specificities of other available 
vehicles, was discarded. The required precision of input data was dramatically 
increased to an extent that variations of place name abbreviations would not be 
recognised by the system. This, coupled with its treatment of data ‘error’ led to 
vehicles associated with these variations being considered as unavailable for 
dispatch. However, with information continuously received by dispatchers, it 
became impossible for them to detect flawed recommendations. Even if they did, 
they could not correct them because there was no contextual information and no 
way of understanding how the recommendation was derived in the first place.  
The example further illustrates how human decisions are grounded in contextual 
understanding and communal work practices, and thus almost impossible to 
operationalise. Recognising the limits of the new system in this case, it became 
clear that what was missing was a shared frame of reference for dispatchers to 
contextualise and follow through the process by which the system arrives at a 
decision. Sufficient ‘mutual intelligibility’ is needed, and the possibilities for 
dispatchers to access, review, comprehend and negotiate with the decisions the 
system comes up with, could better support dispatchers.  
DESIGN FOR TRANSPARENCY 
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The discussion above demonstrates the importance of making it possible for 
people to understand the frame of reference when analysing and responding to 
incidents with models and simulation tools, to examine assumptions, anticipate 
uncertainties, and to creatively disclose instrumental value by tinkering with tools, 
building confidence through these practices.  
To achieve this, the conceptualisation of transparency has to expand from its 
current emphasis on visibility. Transparency in the context of information systems 
more broadly is often conceptualised around ‘forms of information visibility’ 
(Turilli and Floridi, 2009). In the design and use of ubiquitous computing and data 
mining, for example, transparency refers to making visible the processes and 
procedures of data handling, often motivated by privacy concerns (Langheinrich, 
2001; Weitzner et al., 2006). In systems of systems approaches for emergency 
response, the scope, purposes, access points and boundaries of data collection and 
analysis must be made clear (Büscher, Perng, Liegl 2015), and transparency is 
also called for as a ‘legal-technological infrastructure’ needed to move beyond 
binary opting-in/out mechanisms, towards a more genuine enhancement of 
understanding for individuals about the practical consequences of governmental 
and commercial profiling operations (Hildebrandt, 2008). Following this 
definition of transparency, it is argued that the procedures of modelling and data 
analytics should be rendered visible and readable, by both machines and humans 
(Langheinrich, 2001; Zarsky, 2013). Designs for transparency and privacy should 
support more than a notice-and-consent approach, and proponents argue that what 
is needed are approaches that can make users more sensitive to contextual flows 
of information (Nissenbaum, 2011). This argument for transparency as visibility 
and accessibility is useful, but insufficient. 
Visibility is in no small measure defined by the beholder. In other words, people 
can see what they can understand, which means that it can be impossible to make 
the inner workings of complex modelling tools ‘visible’ for the uninitiated. To see 
how algorithms function, one must understand them. Or otherwise know them 
enough to be able to trust or probe them. Transparency requires more than 
disclosure through design. Making a model or simulation system’s frame of 
reference transparent means supporting people in developing trust and capabilities 
of probing its function, in training and other settings. It means that trust is not 
given but is worked up gradually through practical engagement with the system 
and reveal its instrumental value in such ways as accessing, reviewing, negotiating 
with and drawing upon how machines arrive at interpretations and 
recommendations to respond to emergencies. Design for the competent and 
effective use of modelling and prediction systems should support and bring 
together social, algorithmic and collaborative practices to explore incidents with a 
sensitivity to all manner of uncertainties inherent in the events themselves, the 
models and the ways of working with them. Models should enable users to engage 
with inconsistent analyses, re-examine assumptions and constraints, foreground 
otherwise ignored knowledge and practices, for replanning or improvising 
response strategies.  
Several design implications to support transparent reasoning are discussed below 
to indicate some starting possibilities:   
• Human reasoning with machines: Design should support sense- and 
decision-making practices that are often social, collaborative, embodied 
and improvisational. Emergency response should be augmented in ways 
that incorporate exploratory and dialogical ways of collaborating with 
colleagues, other agencies and feeds of on-the-fly analysis. Designs 
should support reviewing, accessing and understanding the assumptions, 
sources, procedures, interpretations and potential inconsistencies when 
augmenting sense- and decision-making. Analyses by machines should 
be considered as one of the tools to sensitise people to particular aspects 
of incidents, but other practices should hold equal importance.  
• Errors and breakdown: however well prepared, any sociotechnical 
system can suffer full or partial breakdown (Graham and Thrift, 2007). It 
can be sensor failure, less-than-desirable data quality, insufficiently 
trained algorithms. When this happens, error messages should aim to 
support human reasoning with machines as argued above. These 
messages should should not stop at suggesting what the error is, but 
should further consider required interaction between expert and practical 
knowledge to diagnose problems and re-draw strategies.  
• Maintenance, tweaking: Assembling and improving algorithms and 
parameter adjustment are practices of realising promises (Mackenzie, 
 Perng and Buscher Uncertainty and Transparency 
 
Short Paper – Ethical, Legal and Social Issues 
Proceedings of the ISCRAM 2015 Conference - Kristiansand, May 24-27 
Palen, Büscher, Comes & Hughes, eds. 
 
  
2013), of fine-tuning and providing better correspondence between world 
and model. The instrumental value of such algorithmic practices should 
be supported more extensively, but this leads to further concerns: Who 
has the skill to maintain and tweak modelling and prediction systems? 
What expertise, skills and knowledge are required and how can this be 
shared more widely or documented in ways that non-experts can grasp?  
• Relational and contextual accountability: Design for transparency has to 
explore how different actors – including the non-human agencies of 
algorithmic logic - become involved in interpreting, acting upon and 
negotiating with data and the results of modelling and prediction. What 
kinds of interdependencies arise, and how are they noticed and dealt 
with? For example, when wearable sensor technologies can be used to 
feed real-time sense- and decision-making of responders into models, 
these models can also become performance evaluation tools, capturing 
data about responders’s actions and communications. Who should see 
such data and should the individuals be identified? When and how to 
‘forget’ such data? And how does the knowledge that real-time collection 
of performance data is being collected affect how responders perform? 
Who should be involved in the evaluation of performance on this basis? 
Responding to these issues should not become a matter of judgement. 
Rather, it should be a matter of reflection and critical democratic 
dialogues (Singleton, 2012).  
CONCLUSION 
This paper explores how modelling and prediction intervene in the un-ness of 
emergencies, resolving some of uncertainties, but also bringing in new ones in 
their wake. By discussing an example of modelling crowd behaviour in 
evacuation situations, and the measures taken to enhance correspondence between 
an unknown and emergent – not yet and hopefully never to become real – world 
and a model and prediction tool, we identified a set of three important dimensions 
of uncertainties inescapably intertwined in modelling: probabilistic and 
exploratory understandings, parameters and the need to adjust them, data 
availability and completeness. We then explored uncertainties arising in the use of 
models and people’s difficulties in negotiating these. This led into an exploratory 
list of issues that design should be more sensitive to and a call to design ‘for’ 
transparency or human practices of making things transparent. The discussion 
shows that it is not possible to ‘simply’ make the inner workings of modelling 
‘visible’ by design. Visibility is a function of the beholder’s position, expertise 
and capability to probe and make sense of systems. It is the latter – practices of 
probing and of making sense of complex systems – that design can support. This 
is what we call for. Further research to enhance transparency is also called for, to 
follow through and trace back how models are transformed in relation to 
uncertainties emerging in the process, as well as how responders work out 
strategies by interrogating the technologies when experiencing uncertainties. 
These will specify critical situations, unfolding in disasters and in lines of code, 
where knowing how models reason can be folded into probing and becoming 
confident in the particular contexts in which the instrumental value of modelling 
and prediction technologies is revealed for augmenting emergency response. 
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